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Abstract
This paper examines R&D tax incentives in oligopolistic markets. We characterize
the conditions under which tax incentives reach the socially desirable level of firm-
financed R&D spending. The outcome of the market depends not only on the level of
technological spillover in the industry but also on the degree of strategic interaction
between the firms. One major result emerges from the model: The socially desirable
level of R&D investment is not necessarily reached by subsidizing R&D. When the
sector spillover is sufficiently low, the government might want to tax R&D investments,
and this result does not necessarily arise because firms are overinvesting in R&D. There
are also cases in which an R&D tax is desirable even though firms are underinvesting
in R&D compared with the first-best optimum. In practice, this theoretical finding
calls for a lower sales tax combined with an R&D subsidy in oligopolistic industries
with high technological spillovers, and a lower sales tax combined with an R&D tax in
oligopolistic industries with low technological spillovers.
Keywords: oligopoly, public policy, R&D tax incentive, spillover, strategic interaction
JEL Classification: H25; L13; O31
∗Tel.: 90-216-483-9340; fax : 90-216-483-9250. Address: Sabanci University - FASS, Orhanli / Tuzla
34956 Istanbul TURKEY. E-mail address: ereninci@sabanciuniv.edu. I am grateful to James Anderson,
Arthur Lewbel, Richard Tresch, participants of EEA-ESEM (2004), EEA Congress (2005), Cambridge-MIT
Institute Interdisciplinary Workshop on Regional Innovation (2006), and especially Richard Arnott for very
helpful comments. This research is financially supported by Paula and Daniel Greeley Award and Boston
College Dissertation Fellowship Award. Travel grants given by the European Economic Association and the
Cambridge-MIT Institute are gratefully acknowledged. An earlier version of this paper is circulated under
the name "A Model of R&D Tax Incentives" (Boston College Working Paper 597). All errors are mine.
1
1 Introduction
Despite the debate in the empirical literature over the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives,
public policy regarding R&D investment has not received much attention from applied mi-
croeconomists. This paper, among a few others, is an attempt to fill this gap in the literature.
We set up a fairly standard model of R&D investment in the presence of strategic interaction
and technological spillovers among firms and obtain a folk theorem. We show that the widely
held idea that subsidizing R&D is beneficial may not in fact hold.
The usual story in support of subsidies is that R&D investment has some of the characteristics
of a public good. It is nonrivalrous and partially nonexclusive in the Samuelsonian sense, and
hence, there are positive externalities that require government subsidization to achieve Pareto
optimality. In fact, many countries have chosen to subsidize R&D investment over the past
twenty to thirty years.1 It is certain that R&D has something of the nature of a public good,
but this is not its only property. Markets are usually oligopolistic in industries that engage
in large amounts of R&D investment. In such industries, the strategic interaction between
firms also plays a crucial role in firms’ decisions about their output and R&D investment
levels.
In analyzing R&D, one needs to take into account not only the spillover effects that give R&D
the characteristics of a public good but also the strategic interaction effects that come from
the oligopolistic nature of the industry. As is well known by now, technological spillovers
between firms leads them to free-ride on each other when making their R&D investment
decisions. This would seem to lead firms to underinvest in R&D. However, at the same time,
the oligopolistic nature of the industry gives firms the power to strategically act against
each other. It is well known in game theory that, in a strategic substitutes (strategic com-
plements) case, the strategic interaction between the players can lead them to overinvest
(underinvest) in the strategic variable. Therefore, in an oligopolistic industry, the strategic
interaction between the firms, in and of itself, leads firms to overinvest in R&D when the
R&D investments of the firms are strategic substitutes. Hence, it is ex ante less clear whether
oligopolistic markets would result in too little R&D investment, and thus, the very widely
1An increasing number of countries are offering special fiscal incentives to businesses to induce spending
on R&D and increase their level of innovation. A survey of the European Commission (1995) on state aid
reports that its members spent over $1 billion per annum on R&D tax incentives during the early 1990’s.
In Canada, because of R&D tax incentives, the after-tax cost of R&D expenditure ranges between 35 and
50 cents per dollar spent depending on the type of firm and the province in which the R&D activity is
conducted. In many other major countries, governments are trying to stimulate and encourage the creation
of new technical knowledge. See Hall (1993, 1995) for a review of the history, regulations, and methodology
related to tax credits in the US and other OECD countries.
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applied R&D subsidies may not be justified in those cases. Indeed, this paper shows that
the socially desirable level of firm-financed R&D investment may not be reached by impos-
ing a subsidy. To the contrary, it is in society’s interest to tax R&D investment when the
technological spillovers are sufficiently low. Second, and more importantly, the paper shows
that taxation does not necessarily result in a lower level of R&D investment in equilibrium.
More specifically, the outcome of the market depends not only on the level of technological
spillover in the industry but also on the degree of strategic interaction between the firms. The
degree of strategic interaction in the model presented here is simply the number of firms in the
industry, which in turn determines the firms’ market power. Thus, whether the government
should subsidize R&D investments must at least be contingent on the technological spillovers
and the number of firms in the industry. In particular, the model shows that it is desirable to
subsidize R&D investments only when the technological spillover exceeds a threshold which
is dependent on the number of firms in the industry (which is formally shown in Proposition
1). Otherwise, it is in society’s best interest to tax R&D investments.
The less intuitive result of the paper is that the government might want to tax R&D in-
vestments even if the firms are underinvesting in R&D. That is, the first-best level of R&D
investment can be reached by imposing a tax on R&D. This tax decreases R&D investment
for every given level of output for sure, but this does not necessarily mean that the equilib-
rium level of R&D will be lower than the equilibrium level without the tax. This seemingly
contradictory result is resolved when one focuses on research intensity (R&D investment per
unit of output) rather than on the equilibrium level of R&D, since, as noted above, oligopolis-
tic power distorts not only levels of R&D but also levels of output. In particular, one should
note that firms tend to produce too little output in an oligopolistic industry. A tax always
discourages research intensity regardless of whether there is equilibrium overinvestment or
underinvestment in R&D ex ante. In a theoretical world without taxes for revenue purposes
but with corrective taxes only, optimality requires the subsidization of output (which is for-
mally shown in Proposition 2). Of course, in reality, governments do not subsidize output to
correct the output problem in oligopolistic industries.2 Indeed, in a realistic general equilib-
rium, the result of subsidization of output should be interpreted as a lower level of sales tax
on output since governments usually collect sales tax for revenue purposes. Combining the
corrective taxes and subsidies on R&D with this intuition, this paper concludes that, given
the number of firms in an industry,
• when technological spillover is sufficiently high, the government should impose a lower
2Note also that Appendix A.8 derives the second-best outcome in which we show that there might be an
R&D tax even in the absence of a corrective tax (or subsidy) on output.
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sales tax combined with an R&D subsidy;
• when technological spillover is sufficiently low, the government should impose a lower
sales tax combined with an R&D tax.
The analysis below focuses on the n firm case of the canonical R&D investment model first
introduced by D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). The model derives only the symmetric
equilibrium, assumes quantity competition à la Cournot, and does not consider the possibil-
ity of R&D cooperation. I do not consider a location choice either. Some of these variations,
which have been studied in depth in the literature (for example, see Atallah (2005, forth-
coming) for a recent analysis of asymmetric spillovers with R&D cooperation, and Devereux
and Griffith (1998, 2003) for the analysis of the interaction of location of production and tax
policy), may alter the results here, and the expected changes in such cases are well known.
However, the model below is sufficient to make our point that there might be an R&D tax
in the optimum.
This paper is also closely related to Leahy and Neary (1997), which focuses on the separate
influences of strategic behavior and R&D cooperation in both Cournot and Bertrand games.
Leahy and Neary compare industry profits in different equilibria and describe the optimal
government intervention but they hardly discuss the possibility of an R&D tax. We believe
that there are industries with small enough spillovers to call for a tax. Moreover, we show
that the tax result becomes more likely when the industry is highly concentrated. Some
sectors have both low spillovers and high concentration.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the model. Section 3 characterizes
the R&D investment for a regulated oligopoly. Section 4 discusses the welfare issues in the
decentralized equilibrium. The direct optimum is also given here. Section 5 concludes and
summarizes the paper. An appendix contains some detailed derivations and proofs.
2 The Model
We set up a three-stage game theoretic model in which we have a representative consumer,
n firms, and a social utility-maximizing government. We assume an oligopolistic market in
which firms engage in output competition à la Cournot. Therefore, we immediately expect
there will be underproduction due to the market power.
In the first stage of the game, the government commits to its optimal tax/subsidy policy on
output and R&D investment. In the second stage, firms decide how much to spend on R&D.
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In the final stage, they decide how much to sell in an oligopolistic market. We allow for the
possibility of imperfect appropriability in the form of inter-firm spillovers.
2.1 Consumers
There is a representative consumer whose preferences are given by a money metric utility
function which is additively separable and linear in the numeraire good m:
U(Q,m) = u(Q) +m , (1)
where Q is the total demand of the representative consumer for output. With this functional
form, there are no income effects, and therefore, the discussion boils down to a partial
equilibrium analysis. Suppose the utility from the total output is quadratic and takes the
following form:
u(Q) = aQ− bQ
2
2
a, b > 0 . (2)
From the maximization problem of the representative consumer we get the linear inverse
demand function:
p(Q) = a− bQ a
b
≥ Q , (3)
where p is the price of the good.3
2.2 Firms
Consider an oligopolistic industry that consists of n symmetric firms indexed by i. Firms
produce a single homogeneous good. When they do not engage in R&D activities the mar-
ginal cost of production is constant and equal to c. We call this the initial marginal cost.
When they engage in R&D activities, the marginal cost of production decreases. In accord
with D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), we assume that R&D investment results in cost
reductions. That it enhances quality can also be assumed in a product differentiation model.
In market economies, the level of cost-reducing R&D is determined by profits. Since profits
may understate/overstate the social benefits at the margin, there is no reason to believe ex
ante that the market outcome is optimal.
For various reasons,4 we assume that the rival firms’ R&D expenditures also reduce a firm’s
3In the general form of the demand function, we need p(Q) to be twice continuously differentiable and
to satisfy ∂p(Q)/∂Q < 0 for all Q ≥ 0 such that p(Q) ≥ 0.
4An example might be the imperfect protection of intellectual property rights.
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marginal cost, but by less than the firm’s own R&D investment. In the model, this effect is
captured by a technical knowledge spillover α within the industry. On one hand, spillovers
reduce the costs of production of one firm. On the other hand, they decrease incentives for
new R&D investment since they help competitors to decrease their costs. We assume that
the marginal cost function is the same for all firms, and takes the following form for firm i:
Φi = Φi(Ii, I−i; c, α) ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} and ∀α ∈ [0, 1] , (4)
where Ii represents the R&D expenditure level of the firm i and I−i for all other firms. Φi is
assumed to be convex in Ii and twice continuously differentiable in Ii and I−i. Since we have
spillovers within the sector, any industrial knowledge rapidly becomes a public good. This
prevents firms from enjoying all the benefits of their own R&D investments. One functional
form which captures this effect for firm i is5
Φi = c− [(1− α)Ii + α
nX
k=1
Ik] . (5)
With n firms, the inverse demand function can be rewritten as follows:
p(qi,q−i) = a− b
nX
k=1
qk , (6)
which is a linear, and therefore, a weakly concave demand function. The convex form for
marginal cost and concave form for the demand function assures the concavity of the profit
function, and hence, the existence of the equilibrium. Here, qi is the output of firm i, and
q−i is the output of all other firms. We assume that R&D represents a cost that depends
on the efficiency of the R&D activities. This has an effect on marginal cost and allocative
efficiency.6 Some amount of subsidy is given for every dollar spent on R&D and output is
taxed.7 The profit function for firm i is, then, given by
Πi(qi,q−i, Ii, I−i) = [p(qi,q−i)− t]qi − qiΦi − (1− s)Ψ(Ii) ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} , (7)
5This is also the average cost of production. For future purposes, marginal cost can also be written as
Φi = c− [Ii + α
Pn
k 6=i Ik].
6Allocative inefficiency occurs when pricing deviates from marginal cost. It is easy to show that p =
ε
nε+1(Φi + t) where ε is defined to be price elasticity (ε = −
d log p(Q)
d logQ ). Therefore, the price is a markup
over after-tax marginal cost. This is similar to the mark-up that can be derived from a Dixit-Stiglitz (1977)
type product differentiation model with one difference: in the Dixit-Stiglitz framework the mark-up is not
dependent on the number of firms in the industry, whereas here it is.
7Initially, we define 0 < t < p(qi, q−i) and s ∈ [0, 1], but we shall relax these assumptions without any
loss of generality whenever an optimum occurs with a negative tax (a subsidy on output) or with a negative
subsidy (a tax on R&D).
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where t is the tax on output, s is the subsidy on R&D, and Ψ(Ii) is the cost of R&D activities
which is a function of R&D investment.
R&D investment might be considered the most important source of product differentiation
in determining whether firms can earn excess profits. Moreover, since R&D investment is
costly, it is going to be a very good way to deter entry. If a new entrant wants to compete
effectively with the incumbents, it has to bear high R&D costs, making it difficult to enter
the market. Therefore, in the R&D-driven sectors we expect to see higher concentration
ratios. Our model is, by no means, a product differentiation model, but it captures the
latter effect. Moreover, we look at those sectors in which a substantial amount of production
cost is affected by R&D investments. Markets are usually oligopolistic in such sectors, which
is why we prefer to use an oligopoly model here.
2.3 The Government
We treat the government as an active player with full commitment powers to set the available
policy tools. The government chooses the optimal policy mix (t∗, s∗) so as to maximize its
social welfare function, which is to be defined later. Optimal policy comprises an output tax
t to deal with market power in the output market and an R&D subsidy s to deal with R&D
market failure.
As with any investment decision, R&D investment is not undertaken by firms unless it is
profitable. Firms sometimes overinvest in R&D as a result of strategic reasons. This makes
government intervention crucial for optimality. We shall show later that a decentralized
equilibrium with tax/subsidy policies by the government exactly matches the optimum of
a welfare-maximizing social planner. By changing the relative cost of R&D for every given
level of output to the cost of any other investment through the optimal tax/subsidy policy
on R&D investments, the government can influence the generation of technical knowledge
in the second best sense. It is an effective tool to internalize spillover effects. Moreover, if
possible, the government can use another tax/subsidy policy to regulate the market power.
These two policies addressing two market failures are sufficient to bring the economy to its
first best frontier.
2.4 The Game
We consider a three-stage game in which the firms and the government interact strategically.
There are infinite continuous choice spaces in all stages of the game.
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In the first stage, the government decides on the linear tax/subsidy rate on the output and
the tax/subsidy for R&D investment. Both together form the optimal policy mix (t∗, s∗).
In the second stage, firms decide their R&D investment levels. When firms act strategically
by choosing R&D before they set their output level, they have a stronger incentive to invest
more in R&D.8 By doing so they gain a stronger competitive advantage over their rivals.
However, externalities associated with technological spillovers mitigates this incentive. When
spillovers are high enough, we expect firms to underinvest in R&D in an unregulated market
equilibrium since spillovers will decrease the marginal costs of all firms.
In the final stage, firms decide how much to sell in the oligopolistic market by engaging in
Cournot competition. Strategic interaction between the firms tends to reduce output, which
makes subsidies justifiable. In the absence of an optimal policy mix (t∗, s∗), there will be
underproduction relative to the direct optimum due to imperfect competition.
We assume that all firms and the government know how their actions will affect the actions of
all the others in the next stages of the game, which requires subgame perfection. Moreover,
for the sake of completeness, it is worth mentioning that our solution concept is backward
induction. Assume n is fixed, for example, because of entry and exit barriers. Therefore, we
can treat the number of firms as a parameter from now on.
3 Characterization of R&D Investment
in a Regulated Oligopoly
The maximization problem of firm i yields the reaction functions for the Cournot outputs:9
qi =
a− b
Pn
k 6=i qk − Φi − t
2b
∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} . (8)
We can get the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the stage-game by solving these reaction func-
tions simultaneously:
qi =
a− t− (n+ 1)Φi +
Pn
k=1Φk
b(n+ 1)
. (9)
8We assume output levels can be adjusted more quickly than R&D investment levels. Therefore, the
output game is played at a later stage than the R&D game.
9All the conditions guaranteeing nonnegativity are assumed from now on. In particular a > Φi > 0.
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Details are given in Appendix A.1. By substituting (9) into the profit function (7) we get
the profit function in the compact format:
Πˆi(qi(Ii, I−i), Ii) = bq2i − (1− s)Ψ(Ii) . (10)
The first-order conditions for the second stage of the game are, then,
∂Πˆi
∂Ii
= 2b
∂qi
∂Ii
qi − (1− s)Ψ0(Ii) ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} . (11)
Therefore, the marginal benefit of R&D for firm i is 2b∂qi∂Ii qi.
Observation 1 In an oligopolistic market with technology spillovers, a firm’s marginal ben-
efit of R&D investment can be decomposed as follows:
(M)(TTC)(
1
RI
) =
2
(n+ 1)| {z }
mark-up
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
inter-firm effectz }| {
nX
k 6=i
(ηΦk:IiΦk)− n
internal effectz }| {
(ηΦi:IiΦi)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠
| {z }
total technology change
qi
Ii|{z}
inverse of research intensity
. (12)
The derivation of Observation 1 is given in the Appendix A.3. Here, M is a mark-up and
ηΦi:Ij is the elasticity of the marginal cost of firm i with respect to the R&D investment
of firm j. Ii/qi is the R&D investment per unit of output which is defined to be level of
the research intensity (RI). The importance of research intensity will become clear when
we discuss the optimal policies on R&D investment. The change in the marginal cost of
production can be interpreted as the change in the production technology of the firm (Total
Technology Change, TTC). As shown in (12), this technology change comes from two
sources. First, the firm’s investment in R&D decreases its own cost of production. This
internal effect is captured by the second term in the large parentheses. Second, there is an
external effect on the firm coming from its rivals. It is impossible for a firm to contribute only
to its own technological accumulation without also contributing to the others’ because of the
spillover involved. Remember that in a Cournot setting, relative technology change is more
important than absolute technology change since all the firms are interacting strategically.
Any technology investment creates a change in the technology of the other firms, which
is captured by the first term in the large parentheses. We cannot say anything about the
sign of this inter-firm effect unless we know the nature of the sector, especially the spillovers
associated with technological improvements. Therefore, the positive externality for the other
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firms might have a negative feedback effect on the firm itself. However, intuitively, the
positive externality is more likely to have a positive effect on the firm itself when there
is high technological transmission in the sector. We shall pin down this result more in
Observation 2.
To go further, assume that the cost of R&D investment is given by
Ψ(Ii) = γ
I2i
2
, (13)
which means that there are diminishing returns to R&D. The parameter γ captures the
efficiency of R&D activities, and 1/γ can be interpreted as the cost effectiveness of R&D.
The greater the cost effectiveness, the better. Since there are n symmetric firms with the
same cost effectiveness parameter, n/γ is an indicator of sectoral cost effectiveness. After
the steps given in Appendix A.2, we can get the R&D spending of the firm given the R&D
spending of the other firms. In other words, the reaction function for the R&D expenditure
is
Ii =
2[n− α(n− 1)][a− t− c+ (2α− 1)
Pn
k 6=i Ik]
(1− s)b(n+ 1)2γ − 2[n− α(n− 1)]2 . (14)
Observation 2 i) If α > 0.5, R&D investments are strategic complements. ii) If α < 0.5,
R&D investments are strategic substitutes.
The proof is obvious. Therefore, if there is high technological transmission (meaning α >
0.5; e.g., there is no strong protection on intellectual property rights) within the industry,
firms enjoy the R&D investments of the other firms. In other words, the R&D investments
of the other firms are supporting the equilibrium level of R&D investment of the firm in
consideration. If there are low spillovers (meaning α < 0.5), the technical information
diffuses less. Then, the R&D investments of the other firms have a negative effect on the
firm’s strategic choice of R&D investments. Since firms are all the same, the stage Nash
equilibrium of the second stage of the game is given by
I∗i =
2[n− α(n− 1)](a− t− c)
(1− s)b(n+ 1)2γ − 2[n− α(n− 1)][1 + α(n− 1)] . (15)
This is the locally stable symmetric R&D profile. Here, the denominator is positive because
of a local stability condition.10 One immediate implication of (15) is that whether the
equilibrium level of R&D in the regulated oligopoly is less or greater than its unregulated
10A short discussion on the derivation of the stability condition is given in Appendix A.7.
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market equilibrium (meaning t = 0 and s = 0) depends mainly on the number of firms in
the industry.
4 Welfare Implications
In this section, we present the welfare implications not only of the decentralized equilib-
rium but also of a direct optimum in which a benevolent social planner can plan both the
production and R&D levels directly. We show that, with the two policy tools, the decen-
tralized equilibrium achieves the first-best equilibrium levels of output and R&D of the
direct optimum. Therefore, in our model, the government’s policy is nothing but a strategic
commitment to ensure that the decentralized equilibrium achieves the direct optimum.
4.1 Decentralized Equilibrium
In the decentralized case, the government can change the equilibrium levels indirectly via
its tax/subsidy policies. Assume that the government maximizes a social welfare function of
the standard type in which the tax revenue is redistributed.11
W (t, s) = u(Q)− γ
2
nX
k=1
I2k −
nX
k=1
qkΦk . (16)
So, the social welfare function is the sum of the surplus of the representative consumer and
industry profits (which is the total revenue from output sold minus the total cost of R&D and
total cost of production). After substituting for the utility function and imposing symmetry
across the firms, social welfare is
W (t, s) = anqi − b
n2q2i
2
− γ
2
nI2i − nqiΦi . (17)
The maximization of (17) gives us the following optimal policy mix for the government.12
(t∗, s∗) =
µ
bγ(a− c)
[1 + (n− 1)α]2 − bnγ ,
3 + n
1 + n
− 2
1 + α(n− 1)
¶
. (18)
11Remember we have an additively separable, money metric utility function.
12Remember that we take the number of firms as given, and restrict our attention only to the symmetric
equilibrium. Therefore, we implicitly constrain the policy space of the government to a symmetric one. That
is, we rule out the differential treatment of the firms in which the government prefers closing down some
firms rather than taxing/subsidizing all.
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The optimal tax/subsidy for R&D equates the marginal social return to R&D to its marginal
cost, and the marginal social return to output to its marginal cost. Therefore, a committed
government would announce the (t∗, s∗) social policy scheme. It is worth mentioning that the
optimal subsidy to R&D investment is independent of a, b, c, γ. That is, the optimal subsidy
is independent of demand characteristics, the initial marginal cost, and the cost effectiveness
of R&D in our model. It depends only on the spillover parameter and number of firms in
the industry. As can be seen from (18), given the number of firms in the sector, the degree
of spillover dictates the degree of government intervention via tax and subsidy policies.
By substituting the optimal policy values into the social welfare function we get
W ∗ =
1
2
µ
nγ(a− c)2
bnγ − [1 + (n− 1)α]2
¶
. (19)
Proposition 1 The government subsidizes R&D investment iff the sector spillover is greater
than 1
3+n . If the sector spillover is less than
1
3+n , taxing R&D investment is the optimum.
Figure 1: Optimal Subsidy and Tax Subspaces
The proof is given in Appendix A.4. Subsidizing R&D is the more typical result. As was
mentioned before, the government’s motivation for subsidizing R&D is to make use of the
positive externality of spillover. If spillover is sufficiently high, it is optimal for firms to
underinvest in R&D due to the well known externality story. It is this story that leads many
governments to introduce R&D tax credits. However, another interesting result emerges
from the model. If spillover is sufficiently low, given a fixed number of firms in the industry,
12
the government might want to tax R&D in the decentralized equilibrium.13 The intuition
is the following. We have two effects acting in the model, namely a strategic effect and a
spillover effect.
The strategic effect comes from the nature of the market, which is a Cournot market in
which firms act strategically. They always want to increase their competitive advantage
over the others. One way of doing that is to overinvest in R&D for every given level of
output. From the perspective of society, this means choosing a higher research intensity
than the desired level. To focus only on this strategic effect, assume for the moment that
there is no spillover. In that case, as shown in Figure 4.1, it is optimal for government to
tax R&D investment for any number of firms in the industry. The motivation for a firm is
to decrease its production cost more than any other firm by investing more in R&D, and
therefore increase its competitiveness. This results in an undesirably high level of research
intensity for the society. This situation is very similar to that of the defense strategies of two
hostile countries such as India and Pakistan. It is individually rational for both countries to
overinvest in military forces. One country’s resources devoted to defense make it a greater
danger for the other, which creates an incentive in that country for overinvestment in the
army. This is, nevertheless, not a collectively rational behavior.
We also have the spillover effect acting in the other way. The more R&D a single firm is
engaged in, the more the sector benefits via spillover effects. In the absence of public policies,
the spillover effect decreases incentives for investing in R&D-intensive technologies because
of the externalities involved. If spillover is sufficiently low, the strategic effect dominates
the spillover effect, and as a result firms overinvest in R&D for every given level of output.
However, if it is high enough, the spillover effect dictates the outcome, and as a result firms
underinvest in R&D for every given level of output.
Figure 4.1 indicates that if the number of firms increases in the market, the taxation of R&D
is at the optimum when there are low spillover levels. Combining Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.1,
we conclude that an R&D tax is more likely to be put in effect when there are fewer firms
in the industry. High performance of the market occurs when there are optimal subsidies
associated with high spillovers or when there are optimal taxes associated with low spillovers.
Proposition 2 The government subsidizes output ∀α ∈ [0, 1].
The proof is in Appendix A.5, and it directly follows from the comparison of the decentralized
equilibrium with the socially desirable level of output. Output is subsidized in our model to
13Even in a second-best world in which output cannot be subsidized an R&D tax result still persists. A
brief discussion of the second-best is given in Appendix A.8.
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Figure 2: Contour Plot of Optimal Tax/Subsidy
offset the underproduction due to market power. Since firms are acting in an oligopolistic
market, they have market power, which lowers social welfare both at the margin and in the
aggregate. Firms are producing too little output, and this is bad for the well-being of the
representative consumer. By subsidizing output, the government not only makes the firms
better off, or at least no worse off, but it also increases the output provided to the consumer,
thereby generating a welfare improvement. It is, indeed, always socially optimal to subsidize
output to close the gap between the marginal cost of production and the price of output.
However, this partial equilibrium result would mean a lower sales tax on output in a general
equilibrium since many governments impose sales tax on output for revenue purposes.
The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game is the following R&D and output pro-
files:14
I∗i =
(a− c)[1 + (n− 1)α]
bnγ − [1 + (n− 1)α]2 (20)
q∗i =
(a− c)γ
bnγ − [1 + (n− 1)α]2 . (21)
4.2 Direct Optimum15
As a benchmark, consider the direct optimum, the optimum of a welfare-maximizing social
planner. That is, assume there is a benevolent social planner who has direct control over
both the output produced by and the R&D investment in a given market. The social welfare
14By looking at the signs of the leading principal minors it is easy to show that second-order condition is
given by bnγ − [1 + (n− 1)α]2 > 0. In the worst case α = 1. When it is the case, n < bγ.
15Some details are provided in Appendix A.6.
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function of the planner takes the same form as before, but since he has direct control over
output and R&D, his choice variables are now the R&D investment profile I = (I1, I2, ..., In),
and the output profile q = (q1, q2, ..., qn).
Wˆ (q, I) = u(Q)− γ
2
nX
k=1
I2k −
nX
k=1
qkΦk . (22)
Therefore,
Wˆ (q, I) = a
nX
k=1
qk − b
(
Pn
k=1 qk)
2
2
− γ
2
nX
k=1
I2k −
nX
k=1
qkΦk . (23)
There is still some possibility for imperfect spillover due to idiosyncratic effects, imperfect
communication, and so forth. The first-orders conditions (FOC ) for the social planner are
∂Wˆ (q, I)
∂qi
= a− b
nX
k=1
qk − Φi = 0 , (24)
and
∂Wˆ (q, I)
∂Ii
= −γIi + qi + α
nX
k 6=i
qk = 0 . (25)
The FOC with respect to R&D indicates that the social marginal cost of R&D investment
has to equal to the total output from the firms resulting from the marginal R&D investment.
After some manipulation the output and R&D levels chosen by the social planner are:
ISi =
(a− c)[1 + (n− 1)α]
bnγ − [1 + (n− 1)α]2 (26)
qSi =
(a− c)γ
bnγ − [1 + (n− 1)α]2 , (27)
where bγ > n. These are the same equilibria we get from the decentralized economy with
the government intervention via tax/subsidy policies (eqs. (20) and (21)). Therefore, the
decentralized economy achieves the first-best optimum. In the next section, we provide the
comparison of the FOCs of the direct optimum with the FOCs of the market equilibrium
to give more insight into how the mechanism works.
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4.3 Comparison of the Direct Optimum with the Market Equilib-
rium
We define the market equilibrium as the outcome in which there is no government interven-
tion via tax and subsidy policies. In an unregulated market R&D incentives are inhibited
by the existence of spillover. The FOCs for the market equilibrium are as follows:
2bqi + b
nX
k 6=i
qk = a− Φi (28)
2b
∂qi
∂Ii
qi = γIi , (29)
where ∂qi∂Ii =
n−α(n−1)
b(n+1) . From (28), which is the FOC with respect to output, we get
b(n+ 1)qi = (a− c) + [1 + α(n− 1)]Ii . (30)
From (29), which is the FOC with respect to R&D investment:
2[n− α(n− 1)]qi = (n+ 1)γIi . (31)
Equations (30) and (31) characterize the market equilibrium in I − q space. The FOCs of
the direct optimum are
nbqi = (a− c) + [1 + α(n− 1)]Ii (32)
[1 + α(n− 1)]qi = γIi . (33)
Equation (32), which is the FOC with respect to output, and equation (33), which is the
FOC with respect to R&D investment, characterize the direct optimum in the I−q space. It
is worth mentioning that equations (31) and (33) define the research intensity in the market
equilibrium and the direct optimum, respectively.
Market Equilibrium
b(n+ 1)qi = (a− c) + [1 + α(n− 1)]Ii
2[n− α(n− 1)]qi = (n+ 1)γIi
Direct Optimum
nbqi = (a− c) + [1 + α(n− 1)]Ii
[1 + α(n− 1)]qi = γIi
Table 1: The First-order Conditions
The FOCs for the market equilibrium and direct optimum are summarized in Table 1. By
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making use of these two pairs of FOCs one can get the optimal tax/subsidy policy which we
derived earlier. More insight can be gleaned from the graphs of these equations in the I − q
space. Graphs of equations (30), (31), (32), and (33) are given in Figure 4.3. In both of the
cases the market fails to provide the optimal amount of output and R&D investment in the
absence of regulation, and either an R&D subsidy or an R&D tax carries the industry to its
direct optimum with the optimal research intensity. Market equilibrium is characterized by
lines KT and OT 0, and the direct optimum is characterized by lines KL and OL0. The slope
of KL is always greater than the slope of KT . That means the optimal policy regarding
market power is always to subsidize output (Proposition 1). However, the slope of OL0 is
smaller than the slope of OT 0 only if α > 1/(3+n). In this situation, it is socially optimal to
subsidize R&D as shown in Figure 4.3a. However, if α > 1/(3+n), the slope of OL0 is greater
than the slope of OT 0, meaning that taxing R&D investment is the optimum (Proposition
2). This situation is shown in Figure 4.3b.
(a) R&D Subsidy:
Market Equilibrium and Direct Optimum
when α > 1/(3 + n)
(b) R&D Tax:
Market Equilibrium and Direct Optimum
when α < 1/(3 + n)
Figure 3: Characterization of the Social Policy
When a firm engages in R&D investment, it is affected twice. First, the production cost
decreases due to the cost-reducing behavior of R&D investments. Second, the production
cost of the other firms decreases due to the spillover effect, which in turn decreases the
competitive advantage of the firm. This second effect is the source of the strategic effect.
Therefore, the investment decision in R&D depends purely on which effect dominates the
other.
Whenever the spillover effect is high enough, firms collectively choose too low a level of R&D
conditional on output compared to the direct optimum. The system is then characterized by
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Figure 4.3a, and the government should provide an R&D subsidy to hit the first-best frontier.
However, if the spillovers level is low, it is in firms’ best interest to choose collectively too
high a level of R&D conditional on output. In this case, we essentially have the strategic
effect dominating the spillover effect. Thus, firms are mostly dependent on their own level of
R&D investment and do not have much incentive to free-ride. This results in overinvestment
in R&D conditional on output level. Such a situation is shown in Figure 4.3b.
Notice that we prefer to focus on R&D per unit of output rather than the equilibrium level of
R&D. Previous literature on R&D investment games tends to focus only on the equilibrium
levels of R&D investment and output. We believe this might be misleading because of the
following reason. As is shown in Figure 4.3, in an R&D tax case, equilibrium levels of
both R&D investment and output can either be higher or lower than those of the direct
optimum, whereas research intensity is always higher in the decentralized equilibrium. A
tax on R&D creates disincentives for R&D investment for every given level of output for
sure, but this does not necessarily result in a lower level of the equilibrium. That is why
we use "R&D for every given level of output" rather than equilibrium level in discussing
over- and underinvestment phenomena. More clearly, in some cases, a tax on R&D might
be required for efficiency even though there is equilibrium underinvestment in R&D. Figure
4.3b illustrates such a case in which both R&D and output profiles of the direct optimum
are larger than those of the market equilibrium (e.g., ISi > IMi and qSi > qMi ) and it is still
beneficial to tax R&D investments. This requires n(n−2)−1
(n−1)[n(n+4)+1] < α <
1
3+n . However, if
α < n(n−2)−1
(n−1)[n(n+4)+1] , then I
S
i < IMi and qSi < qMi .
An important point is that we can reach the first-best optimum since we have two policies,
namely output subsidies and R&D subsidies (or taxes), addressing the two sources of prob-
lems in the industry, namely market power and the incentive-reducing effect of spillover.
Therefore, a committed government can achieve Pareto optimality within the standard de-
centralized competitive market simply by levying proper taxes or subsidies that direct com-
petitive behavior to the Pareto-optimal conditions.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we build a simple framework which is quite flexible and useful for analyzing
many kinds of public policies regarding R&D investment. There is a well-known externality
associated with R&D investment that results from the spillover effect which is a source of
market failure. Such failures generally cause firms to underinvest in research. On the other
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hand, our analysis shows that in an oligopolistic market firms might want to overinvest in
R&D in response to interaction with other firms. Therefore, the market will fail to provide
the right amount of R&D. The most direct way to correct these problems is to subsidize
(or tax) R&D investment to control for under- (or over-) investment. Thus, we need to
determine how these two effects interact in order to discover the conditions under which
subsidies (or taxes) are appropriate.
To solve this problem, this paper sets up a simple game-theoretical model to identify the
conditions under which tax and subsidy policies serve as the means to reach the socially
desirable level of privately financed R&D in a regulated oligopolistic industry. We have
shown that there are cases in which the government might want to tax R&D, contrary to
widespread assumptions in favor of subsidies. Here the tax/subsidy policy can change the
vector of relative prices in the economy from their values in the market equilibrium to the
socially optimal ones so as to reach Pareto efficiency. However, this is more likely to happen
when there are relatively few firms in the industry.
We have also shown that when considering a tax-subsidy policy, we should focus on not only
the equilibrium level of R&D or output but also the research intensity. A tax on R&D lowers
the level of R&D investment for every given level of output, but this does not necessarily
lead to an equilibrium with a lower level of investment. These surprising results come to
light when we consider the realistic play between the spillover effect and the strategic effect.
The model we provide here is a very simple one consisting of linear demand functions and
quadratic costs for R&D investment. This does oversimplify the result, however. Even if
a general demand function were used, the R&D tax result would still persist since a linear
demand function is always going to be a subset of a general demand function. The focus of
the reader, therefore, should not be the optimal values of subsidies and taxes in this model
but the existence of an R&D tax result even in a very general framework.
One might argue that the model presented here is not suitable for the R&D games under
consideration. But then, one should also criticize quite a large number of papers using the
same D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) framework to model R&D games in the same
respect.
One possible reaction to an R&D tax is that there is no empirical evidence showing that there
is overinvestment in R&D. This is correct, but one should also note neither is there empirical
evidence in support of underinvestment. The contemporary techniques are not capable of
analyzing the social optimum empirically. Given the tools, one can at most find some indirect
evidence about over- or underinvestment in R&D. Moreover, as is shown before, an R&D
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tax might be necessary even when there is underinvestment in R&D.
When we consider tax incentives in the real world one practical problem emerges immediately.
We assume that the government can clearly define what constitutes an investment in R&D,
and that the firms do not misreport their R&D investments. In reality, however, this is
not the case. Governments are not able to define R&D activities perfectly, and firms have
an incentive to report some other activities as if they were R&D expenditures. Both have
been important problems in practice. Moreover, in an ideal world, the government should
determine which sectors have the highest social rate of return after an extensive cost-benefit
analysis. In reality, there is a tendency to reward lobbyists and other influential groups
instead of decisions on the basis of cost-benefit analysis.
A Appendix
A.1 Third stage
Firm i’s profit is given by
Πi(qi, q−i, Ii, I−i) = [p(qi, qi)− t]qi − qiΦi − (1− s)Ψ(Ii) ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} . (7)
Therefore, the FOC is
∂Πi
∂qi
= p(qi, q−i)− t− Φi +
∂p(qi, q−i)
∂qi
qi = 0 . (A-1)
With a linear demand function of the form p(qi,q−i) = a− b
Pn
k=1 qk, we have
qi =
a− b
Pn
k 6=i qk −Φi − t
2b
∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} . (8)
Thus
2bq1 = a− b(0 + q2 + q3 + ...+ qn)− Φ1 − t
2bq2 = a− b(q1 + 0 + q3 + ...+ qn)− Φ2 − t
...
...
...
2bqn = a− b(q1 + q2 + ...+ qn−1 + 0)−Φn − t .
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These equations form a system of n equations in n unknowns. Therefore,
2b
nX
k=1
qk = na− b(n− 1)
nX
k=1
qk −
nX
k=1
Φk − nt (A-2)
⇐⇒
nX
k=1
qk =
n(a− t)−
Pn
k=1Φk
b(n+ 1)
. (A-3)
For future reference note that this can be rearranged to get
nX
k 6=i
qk =
n(a− t)−
Pn
k=1Φk
b(n+ 1)
− qi (A-4)
=⇒ qi =
a− bn(a−t)−
Sn
k=1 Φk
b(n+1) + bqi − Φi − t
2b
(A-5)
=⇒ qi =
a− t− (n+ 1)Φi +
Pn
k=1Φk
b(n+ 1)
. (9)
A.2 Second Stage
Πi(qi, q−i, Ii, I−i) = [p(qi,q−i)− t]qi − qiΦi − (1− s)Ψ(Ii) ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} (7)
Πi(qi, q−i, Ii, I−i) = [a− b
nX
k=1
qk − t− Φi]qi − (1− s)Ψ(Ii) .
By substituting for
Pn
k=1 qk and qi
Πˆi(Ii, I−i) = [a− b
µ
n(a− t)−
Pn
k=1Φk
b(n+ 1)
¶
− t− Φi]
µ
a− t− (n+ 1)Φi +
Pn
k=1Φk
b(n+ 1)
¶
− (1− s)Ψ(Ii)
=⇒ Πˆi(Ii, I−i) = b
µ
a− t− (n+ 1)Φi +
Pn
k=1Φk
b(n+ 1)
¶2
− (1− s)Ψ(Ii) ,
which boils down to
Πˆi(qi(Ii, I−i), Ii) = bq2i − (1− s)Ψ(Ii) . (10)
First-order conditions for the second stage of the game are then,
∂Πˆi
∂Ii
= 2b
∂qi
∂Ii
qi − (1− s)Ψ0(Ii) = 0 ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} . (11)
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The marginal cost of R&D is (1− s)Ψ0(Ii), which is equal to marginal benefit 2b∂qi∂Ii qi. Moreover,
Φi(Ii, I−i) = c− [(1− α)Ii + α
nX
k=1
Ik]
= c− (1− α)Ii − α(I1 + I2 + ...+ In) (A-7)
nX
k=1
Φk = nc− (1− α)
nX
k=1
Ik − nα
nX
k=1
Ik
= nc− [1 + α(n− 1)]
nX
k=1
Ik . (A-8)
Hence,
(1− s)Ψ0(Ii) = 2
∂qi
∂Ii
µ
a− t− (n+ 1)Φi +
Pn
k=1Φk
n+ 1
¶
. (A-9)
By using ∂qi∂Ii =
(n+1)−1−α(n−1)
b(n+1)
(1− s)Ψ0(Ii) = 2
µ
(n+ 1)− 1− α(n− 1)
b(n+ 1)
¶µ
a− t− (n+ 1)Φi +
Pn
k=1Φk
n+ 1
¶
. (A-10)
Define the cost of R&D investment as
Ψ(Ii) = γ
I2i
2
. (13)
After some rearrangement, the reaction function in terms of R&D investments for firm i is given
by
Ii =
2[n− α(n− 1)][a− t− c+ (2α− 1)
Pn
k 6=i Ik
(1− s)b(n+ 1)2γ − 2[n− α(n− 1)]2 . (14)
Here, the denominator is positive by local stability condition. Since the firms are all the same the
stage Nash equilibrium of the second stage of the game is given by
I∗i =
2[n− α(n− 1)](a− t− c)
(1− s)b(n+ 1)2γ − 2[n− α(n− 1)][1 + α(n− 1)] . (15)
A.3 Derivation of Observation 1:
From (11) we know that (1 − s)Ψ0(Ii) = 2b∂qi∂Ii qi. Here, the differentiation of output with respect
to R&D investment can be decomposed as follows:
∂qi
∂Ii
=
∂(
Sn
k=1 Φk)
∂Ii
b(n+ 1)
−
∂Φi
∂Ii
b
. (A-11)
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Hence,
(1− s)Ψ0(Ii) = 2bqi
⎛
⎝
∂(
Sn
k=1 Φk)
∂Ii
b(n+ 1)
−
∂Φi
∂Ii
b
⎞
⎠
=
2qi
n+ 1
Ã
nX
k=1
µ
∂Φk
∂Ii
− ∂Φi
∂Ii
¶
− ∂Φi
∂Ii
!
. (A-12)
This can also be written in terms of elasticities. Let ∂Φi∂Ij be the sensitivity of marginal cost of firm
i with respect to R&D expenditure of firm j. Therefore, elasticity of marginal cost of firm i with
respect to the R&D investment of firm j is defined as
ηΦi:Ij =
Ij
Φi
∂Φi
∂Ij
. (A-13)
Thus,
(1− s)Ψ0(Ii) =
2
(n+ 1)| {z }
mark-up
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
inter-firm effectz }| {
nX
k 6=i
(ηΦk:IiΦk)− n
own effectz }| {
(ηΦi:IiΦi)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠
| {z }
total technology change
qi
Ii|{z}
inverse of research intensity
. (12)
A.4 Proof of Proposition 1:
We have already found that s = 3+n1+n−
2
1+α(n−1) . If s > 0, then
3+n
1+n −
2
1+α(n−1) > 0. With n greater
than or equal to 1 this reduces α > 13+n .
A.5 Proof of Proposition 2:
Simple comparison of the decentralized equilibrium’s FOCs with the direct optimum FOCs shows
that t∗ = −bq∗i where q∗i > 0. Therefore, the government subsidizes output.
A.6 Direct Optimum
Wˆ (q, I) = u(Q)− γ
2
nX
k=1
I2k −
nX
k=1
qkΦk (22)
Wˆ (q, I) = a
nX
k=1
qk − b
(
Pn
k=1 qk)
2
2
− γ
2
nX
k=1
I2k −
nX
k=1
qkΦk . (23)
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The marginal cost function is Φi(Ii, I−i) = c − (1 − α)Ii − α
Pn
k=1 Ik. The first order conditions
for the social planner are
∂Wˆ (q, I)
∂qi
= a− b
nX
k=1
qk − Φi = 0 (24)
∂Wˆ (q, I)
∂Ii
= −γIi + qi + α
nX
k 6=i
qk = 0 . (25)
From (24) a−b
Pn
k=1 qk−c+(1−α)Ii+α
Pn
k=1 Ik = 0. From (25) [1+α(n−1)]
Pn
k=1 qk = γ
Pn
k=1 Ik.
Solving both together we get
na− nb
nX
k=1
qk = nc−
[1 + α(n− 1)]2
γ
nX
k=1
qk . (A-14)
By imposing symmetry ISi =
(a−c)[1+(n−1)α]
bnγ−[1+(n−1)α]2 and q
S
i =
(a−c)γ
bnγ−[1+(n−1)α]2 where bγ > n.
A.7 Stability Condition
Here, we do not go into details of the issue of stability in Cournot markets, since it is out of the
scope of this paper.16 Instead, we will derive the local stability condition that we need.
The stage Nash equilibrium of the game is locally stable iff
∂2Πˆ∗i
∂I2i
+ (n− 1) ∂
2Πˆ∗i
∂Ii∂Ij
< 0 ∀n; i 6= j; i, j ∈ {1, 2, ...n} . (A-15)
where Πˆ∗i represents the equilibrium level of profits and
∂2Πˆ∗i
∂I2i
= 2b
Ãµ
∂qi
∂Ii
¶2
+ qi
∂2qi
∂I2i
!
− (1− s)γ (A-16a)
=
2[n− α(n− 1)]2
b(n+ 1)2
− (1− s)γ (A-16b)
∂2Πˆ∗i
∂Ii∂Ij
= 2b
µ
∂2qi
∂Ii∂Ij
qi +
∂qi
∂Ii
∂qi
∂Ij
¶
(A-17a)
=
2[n− α(n− 1)](2α− 1)
b(n+ 1)2
. (A-17b)
Therefore, the stability condition is
(1− s)b(n+ 1)2γ − 2[n− α(n− 1)][1 + α(n− 1)] > 0 . (A-18)
which is exactly the same as the denominator of the equilibrium level of R&D spending.
16For a discussion of stability in oligopolies see Leahy and Neary (1997).
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A.8 Second-Best Optimum
In this case we cannot reach the direct optimum, but the R&D tax result is still preserved. Suppose
it is not possible to subsidize output. This can be obtained from our calculations for the first-best
simply by setting t = 0 in the social welfare function. Then, the optimal subsidy in the second-best
is as follows:
sSB =
2− n+ (n− 1)(n+ 4)α
2 + n+ (n+ 2)(n− 1)α . (A-19)
where SB stands for second-best. It is optimal to tax R&D whenever α < n−2(n−1)(n+4) .
2 4 6 8 10
n
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
α
First −Best Threshold
Second −Best Threshold
n=1
Figure 4: First-best and Second-best Thresholds
Figure A.8 shows the first-best and second-best thresholds at the same graph. First-best threshold
is the same curve given in Figure 4.1 and the second-best threshold is the counterpart of it in the
second best environment. In a second-best environment, taxing R&D is optimal anywhere below
that threshold.
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